Indian electronics policy now suffers from two opposite forms of dishonesty. Government boosters speak as though every phone leaving a local assembly line is wholly Indian. Cynics sneer that assembly is meaningless screwdriver work. Both positions are convenient and wrong. Assembly is how manufacturing ecosystems often begin: workers learn processes, suppliers qualify, logistics improve and global companies discover that production is possible at scale. But assembly is not the destination. The valuable, difficult parts—components, tooling, materials, design and intellectual property—determine whether India has built resilience or merely a new address for final-stage work.
The large-scale electronics PLI was explicitly designed to reward incremental production. The MeitY scheme page sets out the incentive structure. MeitY’s 2025–26 annual report describes the related hardware scheme and reported production progress. These are not imaginary achievements. India exports far more electronics than it did a decade ago, large contract manufacturers have expanded and the country matters increasingly in global diversification. The question is what comes after the first visible win.
Assembly deserves respect and scrutiny
People who dismiss assembly usually underestimate its discipline. Producing millions of devices at acceptable yield requires quality control, supplier scheduling, traceability, worker training and constant process improvement. A factory is not a room where imported kits politely assemble themselves. India should be proud that global companies entrust local plants with scale and export markets. Those capabilities spill into other sectors and create a managerial workforce that policy cannot conjure through classroom certificates.
Yet gross output exaggerates depth. The retail value of a phone includes processors, displays, memory, camera modules, radio components, software and brand margin. If many of those inputs arrive from abroad, counting the finished phone’s entire value as Indian production answers the wrong question. The government should publish sector-level domestic value addition using a consistent method. It should show how that share changes over time and which component categories remain strategic bottlenecks. Pride survives measurement; propaganda avoids it.
Chinese brands illustrate the difference between nationality and ecosystem. Xiaomi, Vivo, Oppo, Realme and their peers succeeded in India not merely because they undercut rivals. They built distribution, service networks, financing partnerships, localisation teams and rapid product cycles. Behind them sits China’s extraordinary component and manufacturing base. Even when a handset is assembled in India, the brand can draw on suppliers clustered around Shenzhen and elsewhere. Indian policy must compete with that system, not congratulate itself for changing the final shipping label.
Why Chinese brands still dominate the practical middle
Indian buyers are brutally rational in the ₹15,000–₹30,000 range. They want a bright display, good battery, fast charging, acceptable cameras, local service and a price that survives household scrutiny. Chinese brands iterate quickly because their supply chains allow them to combine parts at numerous price points. They also understand offline retail incentives. A nationalist advertisement cannot overcome a shopkeeper recommending the model with better margin, faster service and features the buyer can see immediately.
Non-Chinese alternatives remain uneven. Samsung has enormous manufacturing presence and a broad portfolio, but some mid-range models feel conservatively specified. Indian brands have returned in limited ways but lack the scale, software support and supplier leverage required for sustained competition. Apple operates in a different price universe even as its Indian manufacturing footprint grows. “Make in India” therefore cannot be evaluated by whether a brand’s passport feels politically comfortable. It must be evaluated by value created, capability transferred and consumer outcomes.
Security concerns are legitimate. Telecom equipment, connected devices and software services create data and infrastructure risks that governments must assess. But security review should be rule-based, technically competent and predictable. Informal hostility or arbitrary delays discourage investment without necessarily reducing dependence. India needs testing laboratories, source-code and network standards where appropriate, strong privacy law, supply-chain disclosure and procurement rules for sensitive systems. Serious security policy is duller than app bans and far more useful.
Software is another weak point hidden by production celebrations. A device assembled locally can still ship with intrusive advertising, delayed updates and uninstallable clutter. Consumer welfare should be part of industrial strategy. Longer security support, transparent update commitments, repair access and restrictions on deceptive interfaces would force brands to compete on ownership quality. The cheapest phone becomes expensive when it is unsafe after two years or impossible to repair. Domestic manufacturing should not mean domestic consumers accepting global leftovers.
The component mission must reward learning
India’s next incentives should focus on component ecosystems where local production can become globally competitive: enclosures, batteries, camera subassemblies, connectors, printed circuit boards, display-related inputs, power electronics and specialised materials. Not every component should be made locally at any cost. Autarky would produce expensive devices and sheltered firms. Policy should target areas with growing domestic demand, export potential and transferable capability, then require measurable localisation rather than permanent protection.
Tooling deserves more attention. The ability to design and manufacture moulds, dies, fixtures and production equipment determines how quickly an ecosystem can adapt. These firms are often medium-sized, invisible and starved of patient capital. A glamorous semiconductor announcement receives headlines; a network of excellent toolmakers creates everyday competitiveness. Credit guarantees, shared testing centres, technical partnerships and procurement access can help without turning every supplier into a subsidy dependent.
Research incentives must also become less ceremonial. Filing patents is not the same as owning useful technology. Companies receiving public support should report engineering employment, supplier-development spending and products designed for global markets from India. Universities need industry-linked laboratories and researchers need easier movement between academia and firms. India cannot claim design leadership if the best engineers spend their careers adapting specifications written elsewhere. Manufacturing and research are not separate ministries in the life of a product.
There is a labour question beneath the export numbers. Electronics factories have created opportunities, including for women, but job quality, transport, housing and advancement matter. A young worker should be able to move from line operation to technician, supervisor or quality engineer through recognised training. High turnover may suit short production cycles but prevents skill accumulation. Incentives should therefore track wages, retention, training and management progression, not merely headcount on inspection day.
Critics argue that incentives simply pay companies to do what market diversification already required. There is some truth here. Global firms wanted alternatives to concentrated China risk. India possessed a large market and labour pool. Policy must demonstrate additionality: did support accelerate investment, deepen localisation or win exports that would otherwise go elsewhere? That is why transparent evaluation matters. A successful scheme should be able to survive the rude question, “What did taxpayers buy?”
I give the government substantial credit for moving electronics manufacturing from aspiration to visible scale. I also refuse to treat scale as completion. The next phase is harder because components require patient suppliers, technology transfer, exacting quality and years of learning. Chinese brands remain strong because they sit atop precisely that depth. India will not displace it through slogans, nor should consumers be asked to finance inefficient nationalism. Win on capability, service, design and price. Assembly got India onto the field. Components will decide whether we control the game.



