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Manufacturing Policy Has Finally Acquired a Spine; Now It Needs Better Accounting

The National Manufacturing Mission is the kind of supply-side reform Congress spent years discussing without executing at scale. I support its ambition, but production totals must no longer be allowed to masquerade as proof of deep domestic value creation.

Meenakshi Iyer
· 6 min read
Manufacturing Policy Has Finally Acquired a Spine; Now It Needs Better Accounting
Ministry of Home Affairs / GODL-India

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There is a peculiar Delhi habit of treating factories as morally inferior to policy papers about factories. For years, the respectable consensus was that India could leap directly from farms to sophisticated services while manufacturing remained somebody else’s smoky twentieth-century problem. Then the same people wondered why millions of young Indians could not find productive work, why supply chains bent toward China and why every global shock arrived at our doorstep in the form of a shortage. The current government’s manufacturing push is not flawless, but it begins with a truth the old establishment evaded: scale has to be built deliberately.

The latest Economic Survey gives the National Mission on Manufacturing a clearer architecture than the usual slogan. Its manufacturing chapter sets out sectoral and cluster-based ambitions, distinguishing industries that can scale quickly from those needing repair and strategic sectors that must be seeded. That is already more useful than another declaration that India should become competitive. The state is trying to coordinate infrastructure, skills, standards, finance and technology around actual production ecosystems. I give the government credit because coordination, not a shortage of clever entrepreneurs, has long been India’s missing ingredient.

The left’s subsidy caricature misses the point

Critics on the left describe production-linked incentives and industrial missions as gifts to corporations. The phrase is designed to end thought. Any industrial policy can be captured, and every rupee of public support should be scrutinised. But a conditional incentive paid against incremental output is not the same thing as handing a favoured firm a cheque for existing activity. The relevant questions are whether investment is additional, whether domestic value rises, whether workers acquire useful skills and whether firms remain after incentives taper. Calling the entire project cronyism without examining those tests is activism, not analysis.

Congress’s position is even more muddled. Its leaders attack the government for insufficient jobs, insufficient exports and dependence on imports, then recoil from the instruments used by almost every serious manufacturing power to build capacity. Congress governments used tariffs, public procurement, tax concessions and sector-specific schemes too, often with far less transparent performance criteria. The nostalgia now offered for the pre-2014 economy omits stalled projects, unreliable power, retrospective taxation and the bureaucratic sport of making an investor collect signatures across ministries. The Modi era did not abolish those frictions, but it has treated their removal as central rather than cosmetic.

The official Union Budget portal and its tax-reform documents show how industrial policy now reaches beyond headline subsidies into customs structures, component availability and investment rules. That matters because a factory is not summoned by announcing one. It depends on ports, power quality, vendor depth, land, testing laboratories, logistics and predictable taxation. The government’s strongest reforms—GST, insolvency law, corporate-tax rationalisation, public digital infrastructure and large capital spending—are not manufacturing schemes in name. Together they alter whether making a product in India is commercially sane.

Assembly is a beginning, not a triumph

Where I part company with the cheerleaders is in the accounting. Gross production and export values can rise dramatically while imported components still carry much of the value. A phone assembled in India is not fictitious production; assembly builds process discipline, jobs and supplier relationships. Yet it is a first rung. Ministers weaken their own case when they present the final sale price of assembled goods as though every rupee were domestically created. Serious supporters of Make in India should demand a domestic-value ledger by sector, not applaud the largest available number.

The mission should publish annual scorecards showing local value addition, new supplier formation, wages, research spending, export destinations, incentive paid per durable job and the share of firms graduating from support. These need not reveal commercial secrets. Aggregated and independently audited figures would let taxpayers distinguish an infant industry learning to walk from an industry that has learned to lobby. If a scheme misses its milestones, the answer should not automatically be another five years of protection. Industrial policy needs an exit culture as much as venture capital does.

Employment deserves equal honesty. Modern factories can produce extraordinary value with fewer workers than the textile mills of political imagination. India therefore needs a portfolio: electronics and semiconductors for strategic capability, automobiles and machinery for supplier depth, textiles and food processing for labour absorption, and smaller manufacturing clusters for dispersed opportunity. One fashionable mega-factory cannot substitute for thousands of competent medium enterprises. The mission’s cluster logic is promising precisely because it recognises the ecosystem between the multinational logo and the worker at the gate.

Labour reform remains the unresolved part of the story. Parliament passed new labour codes, but implementation has moved slowly because states must align rules and politics becomes nervous whenever reform reaches the shop floor. The government has shown more courage on highways than on labour markets. It should make compliance simpler for honest firms, preserve core protections, enable women to work safely across shifts and create portable benefits for a workforce that changes employers. The left’s answer—freeze every arrangement in the name of security—protects insiders while condemning outsiders to informality.

States must compete on competence, not giveaways

The most encouraging change is the competition among states. Chief ministers now advertise logistics, plug-and-play facilities and approval timelines because investment decisions are visible political trophies. But competition can decay into free land and tax waivers with no discipline. The Union government should publish comparable data on factory construction time, power reliability, port dwell time, contract enforcement and worker training. Rankings should measure operating reality rather than how elegantly a state filled out a questionnaire. Investors already know the difference; citizens deserve to know it too.

This is also where the INDIA alliance’s manufactured outrage about federalism becomes tiresome. Many opposition-run states actively court the same manufacturers their national leaders denounce at rallies. Good. They should. Industrialisation should not be a BJP possession. Tamil Nadu’s manufacturing base, Karnataka’s technology ecosystem, Maharashtra’s supplier networks and Gujarat’s infrastructure all contain lessons. The Centre’s task is to create common rules and national capability while allowing states to specialise. Competitive federalism is not an insult to state autonomy; it is autonomy made economically consequential.

Skills policy must become less ceremonial. A certificate from a training centre is worthless if a plant must retrain its holder from scratch. Employers should co-design curricula, apprenticeships should be easier to offer, and funding should follow verified placement and wage progression rather than enrolment. India’s young people do not need motivational speeches about becoming global talent. They need machines on which to learn, supervisors who can teach and transport that gets them safely to industrial areas. This is mundane administration, which is why television panels prefer arguing about billionaires.

There is a strategic dimension too. India will not replace China across every supply chain, nor should policy be built on that fantasy. China’s scale, infrastructure and supplier density were accumulated over decades. India’s opportunity lies in becoming indispensable across selected chains while building resilience in components where dependence creates national risk. That means cooperating with Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese, European, American and, where security permits, Chinese capital. Economic nationalism becomes self-defeating when it confuses domestic capability with domestic isolation.

I support the mission because it accepts that markets operate inside systems the state helps shape. I criticise its publicity because ambition is not evidence. The government should keep the incentives conditional, deepen logistics and power reforms, implement sensible labour rules, make local-value data public and close schemes that fail. Congress should offer amendments rather than reheated suspicion of enterprise. If India succeeds, it will not be because a minister unveiled one perfect policy. It will be because factories, suppliers, workers and governments improved together—and because someone finally counted what was actually made here.

#manufacturing #economic-survey #reforms #jobs
Meenakshi Iyer

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Tired of Lutyens Delhi's chosen narratives. Calls out manufactured outrage from the INDIA alliance and the commentariat that amplifies it for what it is.

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