Two bad habits dominate discussion of electronics manufacturing in India. Government supporters announce every assembled phone as proof that self-reliance has arrived. Critics dismiss every factory as screwdriver work and imply nothing has changed. Both positions are lazy. India has unquestionably expanded electronics production and exports through policy, market scale and supply-chain diversification. It has also remained dependent on imported components, machinery and intellectual property across much of the value chain. Progress is real; depth is unfinished.
The government deserves credit for sustained attention. An official Semicon India update describes approved projects and the growth of electronics output, while a later parliamentary account of manufacturing schemes sets out the PLI framework and reported performance. These are government claims and should be audited as such, but they describe a policy architecture far more serious than the old habit of celebrating a memorandum of understanding as though wafers were already leaving a fabrication plant.
Assembly is a start, not an insult
I dislike the sneer attached to assembly. Manufacturing capability develops in layers. Large assembly operations create demand for logistics, quality control, tooling, packaging, testing and supplier coordination. Workers and managers learn production discipline. Global firms become familiar with operating at Indian scale. No country jumps from importing finished devices to controlling every component overnight. The correct question is not whether assembly counts. It is whether policy creates incentives and conditions for the next layer to emerge.
That transition is not automatic. A company can assemble imported kits for years if tariffs and incentives make the arithmetic favourable. Domestic value addition may remain shallow while impressive export totals grow. The government should therefore publish clearer product-level measures of local value, net foreign exchange and supplier development. Gross export numbers are politically satisfying but can obscure imported content. Industrial policy becomes credible when it measures what is difficult, not only what is flattering.
Production-linked incentives have helped attract scale, yet they must remain temporary tools rather than permanent compensation for structural weakness. Firms should know the glide path. In return for public support, India should seek measurable capability: local component sourcing, engineering employment, worker training, research partnerships and export competitiveness after incentives decline. The objective is not to keep every subsidised factory alive. It is to create an ecosystem in which efficient factories no longer require extraordinary support.
Why Chinese brands still dominate the shelf
Indian consumers did not choose Chinese smartphone brands because of a geopolitical theory. They chose features, distribution, financing and prices. Chinese companies became formidable at matching fast product cycles to local demand. They built service networks, retailer relationships and portfolios across price bands. “Make in India” cannot dislodge that competence through patriotic advertising alone, especially when many Chinese-branded phones are themselves assembled in Indian plants.
This apparent contradiction is useful. Manufacturing policy and brand nationality are separate questions. India benefits when more production occurs locally, regardless of the logo, provided rules are followed and value deepens. It also benefits from domestic brands that invest in design and customer support rather than applying their names to generic imports. The goal should be competitive capability, not a protected museum of Indian labels.
Chinese dominance also reflects component ecosystems built over decades. A phone maker near Shenzhen can access displays, connectors, camera modules, batteries, tooling and specialised labour within an extraordinary radius. India cannot reproduce that density through one giant plant. It needs clusters with reliable power, ports, customs, housing, technical institutes and hundreds of suppliers. Industrial policy is urban policy, education policy and trade policy wearing safety shoes.
Semiconductors require patience and scepticism
Chip manufacturing attracts political glamour because a fabrication plant symbolises technological sovereignty. It also consumes capital, water, power and specialised expertise on an unforgiving scale. India should pursue semiconductor capacity, but it should resist treating every chip equally. Packaging, testing, compound semiconductors, power electronics, sensors and mature-node production may offer practical footholds alongside ambitious fabrication projects. Design is already an Indian strength in global companies; policy should help more intellectual property become Indian-owned and commercially scaled.
Announcements must be separated from construction, construction from qualification and qualification from profitable production. A fab is not operational because a foundation stone has excellent lighting. Customers require consistent yields and long validation cycles. The public deserves milestone reporting because subsidies are substantial and opportunity costs are real. If a project changes scope, say so. If technology partners withdraw, explain the response. Industrial policy gains legitimacy through honest iteration.
Skills are the quieter constraint. Engineering graduates do not automatically become process technicians, equipment specialists or manufacturing managers. Institutes need industry-designed curricula, apprenticeships and laboratories that teach production reality. Mid-career training matters because ecosystems cannot wait twenty years for an entirely new workforce. India should also welcome global experts without insecurity. Technology transfer occurs through people solving problems together, not through a clause in a press release.
The next decade is about capability
I would judge success through a set of unromantic questions. How many component suppliers export without subsidy? How much local design is embedded in finished products? Can factories switch products without importing every tool and engineer? Are women participating in the manufacturing workforce safely and at scale? Do smaller firms receive timely payments from anchor companies? Can a plant maintain quality during rapid expansion? These measures reveal whether an ecosystem is learning.
Trade openness remains essential. Self-reliance should mean resilience and capability, not autarky. Electronics supply chains are global because specialisation matters. India will import advanced equipment and components even as it manufactures more. Sensible trade agreements can secure inputs and open export markets. Sudden tariff changes, by contrast, make planning difficult and may protect inefficient local production. A confident industrial strategy knows which dependencies are risky and which exchanges are mutually productive.
The government’s achievements deserve more credit than reflexive critics allow. India is no longer discussing electronics manufacturing as a distant possibility. Factories, exports and investment have changed the baseline. But the government’s own success raises the standard. The next press release cannot merely count phones. It must show deeper value, stronger suppliers, useful skills and technology that remains when incentives fade. “Made in India” is printed on a box. Manufacturing power is the network of knowledge behind it.
